
- “The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war.”
- What does Fukuyama mean by “the end of history”? What doesn’t he mean?
- “are there…any fundamental “contradictions” in human life that cannot be resolved in the context of modern liberalism, that would be resolvable by an alternative political-economic structure?” Is this a good ‘test’?
- Do you agree with Fukuyama that the ‘class issue’ has largely been “solved” in Western liberal democracies?
- Two decades on, do you agree with Fukuyama’s analysis of China?
- Possible counterarguments
  - “The rise of religious fundamentalism…the revival of religion in some way attests to a broad unhappiness with the impersonality and spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist societies. Yet while the emptiness at the core of liberalism is most certainly a defect in the ideology—a flaw that one does not need the perspective of religion to recognize—it is not at all clear that it is remediable through politics.”
  - “nationalism and other forms of racial and ethnic consciousness.” [this forms the core argument of Robert D. Kaplan’s The Coming Anarchy] Fukuyama responds by saying that “only systematic nationalisms like [National Socialism] can qualify as a formal ideology on the level of liberalism or communism.
- “The death of [Marxism] means the growing “Common Marketization” of international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states.” Is this ‘perpetual peace’? Or something else?
- “The end of history will be a very sad time?” (Why does Fukuyama say this?)
- Other than political Islam and “the coming anarchy”, what other issues might “get history started once again”?


- “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural…The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”
- The conflict of nations (1648-1917), the conflict of ideologies (1917-1989), and the conflict of civilizations
- Defining a ‘civilization’: “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.”
- Seven or eight major civilizations: “Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African”
- Causes of Conflict
  - Kinds of difference: “history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy…Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence.”
  - How is the nation-state being weakened as a source of identity, and what seems to be filling the gap?
  - A “return to the roots” phenomenon as a response to Western power
  - “cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily…resolved”
- What are the “two levels” (micro/macro) at which civilizations clash?
- Fault Lines: Protestant or Catholic / Orthodox or Muslim, Islamic Arab civilization / pagan, animist, Christian Africa, Orthodox / Muslim, Muslim / Hindu, Confucian / Buddhist (Tibet) and Muslim (Uigher)
- “The West Versus the Rest”. Is the US now past the peak of its power? If so, who or what is replacing it?
  - “a course of isolation” (North Korea / Myanmar (Burma)), “band-wagoning”, and “balance the west”